YOUTH COUNSELLING AGAINST RADICALISATION

GUIDELINES FOR FRONT-LINE WORKERS
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Executive summary

In recent years radicalisation toward violent extremist and terrorist positions has been considered an increasing treat in the European Union. The Erasmus + project Youth Counselling Against Radicalisation (YCARE) responds to this phenomenon, taking as staring point that international cooperation is necessary to effectively combat cross-border radicalisation and terrorism. YCARE is carried out with expertise in different fields relevant to efforts to counter radicalisation. Professionals in education and researchers on radicalisation combine their strengths in developing products to equip youth workers in detecting and dealing with radicalisation.

Various projects have been carried out in the field of radicalisation, resulting in an increasing knowledge base. One of the aims of YCARE is to share existing knowledge about radicalisation that might be relevant for youth counsellors around Europe. We focus on youth counsellors of all sorts, ranging from educators to social services staff. Our products might be relevant for all professionals working with young people who are vulnerable to radicalisation, or who have already been radicalised.

YCARE is unique for its focus on the relationship between radicalisation and pedagogics. To this day the pedagogical roots of radicalisation have not received much attention while there are sufficient indications that education risks and protective factors can be identified that are highly relevant for prevention and symptomatic treatment. Education is important for prevention and can be integrated in comprehensive programs aimed at de-radicalisation or disengagement. YCARE is practice oriented in providing concrete activities for immediate use.

In order to create a solid basis for the project, we conducted a needs assessment among professionals in eight European countries. This needs assessment included an online questionnaire in which professionals in the field of youth counselling were asked about their views on the phenomenon of radicalisation as well as their own needs as a professional. In addition, a few dozen professionals were interviewed to get a more profound understanding of their awareness and understanding of radicalisation and their vision on their own role as a professional in combatting this phenomenon. The needs assessment was carried out from March to June 2016.

In order to meet the needs of youth counsellors that were revealed by the questionnaire and interviews the YCARE partners developed these Guidelines and a Toolbox. Both can be consulted via the YCARE website: https://www.ycare.eu. On the YCARE website professionals can also find additional information about the project in the form of news updates.

These Guidelines provide information about the process of radicalisation, the factors underlying this, the role of radical organisations and their use of digital media. Special attention is given to the relation between radicalisation and education. Descriptions of the most important radical currents in Europe - radical Islam, the extreme right and the extreme left are also covered by the handbook. One part of the handbook is dedicated to guidelines to inform about targeted youth support. In this part strategies are addressed that are employed to help vulnerable young people early to address their difficulties and to prevent their problems from escalating. Attention is paid to early detection strategies, prevention strategies, intervention strategies and exit strategies.

The Toolbox consists of three separated boxes. In the first box we will store activities. This box contains training material in the form of exercises for immediate use in an educational context. The activities can be used for prevention ends but may also be useful in a setting in which counsellors' work with radicalised youth. The second box stores good practices. In countries such as the Nether-lands and Germany many successful initiatives have been realised that contribute to combatting radicalisation. The good practices show what kind of efforts are undertaken in radicalisation prevention and intervention. They serve as a source of inspiration for further development of counter-radicalisation programs in countries all over Europe. The third box stores awareness raising material such as: general tools, multimedia tools, promotional materials. This material will help...
professionals to gain more insight in the phenomenon of radicalisation. In addition to the YCARE handbook, the material in the third box will help professionals in detecting radicalisation.

In addition, an online platform and mobile applications are created to support the delivery of the outputs of the projects. The platform and applications facilitate interaction between learners and trainers. It supports electronic management, storage and presentation of materials and thus create the conditions necessary for a dynamic teaching environment.
0 Introduction: How to use these Guidelines

If you are interested in the YCARE project, its aims and its approach, start with chapter 1. We start with a short overview on the topic of radicalisation and the need for a pedagogical approach. We then explain shortly the role of youth counselling in Europe and the needs of youth counsellors on the topic of radicalisation. We give an overview of other European projects and end this chapter with the contribution of the YCARE project.

If you are interested to know more about radicalisation, then go to chapter 2. First, the phenomenon of radicalisation will be discussed. In this paragraph, characteristics of a radical person and controversies around the definition of radicalisation will be explained. Next, the so called staircase to terrorism will be presented to gain more insight in the stages a radicalising person goes through. The model visualizes the process of radicalisation by the means of a metaphor of a staircase. We then discuss trigger factors in the radicalisation process. Trigger factors are concrete events that initiate identifiable radicalisation or de-radicalisation. Next, a distinction will be made between various types of radical persons. As will become clear, persons with a certain radical profile are more or less sensitive for certain trigger factors. The subsequent paragraph is about the way in which radical persons operate. Attention will be paid to the organisation structures of radical groups as well as on persons who self-radicalize: the lone wolves. We then describe radical ideologies shortly, such as the radical ex-treme-right, the radical extreme-left and radical Islam. We conclude with a short description of radicalisation in [country].

If you are interested in the question what works for youth counsellors, go to chapter 3. In this chapter will show the aims and methods of different practices. We start with early detection practices, followed by prevention activities. Then three different kind of interventions are presented. These units are focused on community empowerment and engagement, family support and delivering alternative narratives. In the last unit exit strategies are discussed. In the last paragraph we make the connection with the YCARE Toolbox, containing Good Practises and Activities.
1. Youth counselling and radicalisation
1. Youth counselling and radicalisation

1.1 Introduction

The purpose of the YCARE project is to raise awareness among first-line professionals working with youth about the issue of radicalisation. We want to stimulate that they are well equipped in their workplace to detect and respond properly to radicalisation. First-line practitioners can make an important contribution to this issue and include teachers, youth workers, community police officers, child protection workers and (mental) health care workers.

Potentially, first-line practitioners have the ability to recognize and refer individuals who may be vulnerable. First-line practitioners do not always have a sufficient understanding of radicalisation, do not necessarily understand the warning signs, or know what to do in response. Therefore, raising their awareness on this issue is required. Furthermore, it is very important to provide first-line practitioners with strategies of de-radicalisation, for community engagement and empowerment, educating young people and family support.

In this YCARE project “Youth counselling against radicalisation: a pedagogical approach”, we have collected and developed materials and methods to provide support to first-line professionals working with youth. The following products have been developed:

A Toolbox that consists of three elements:
- Activities
- Good practices
- Awareness raising material

Guidelines which refer to the Toolbox

The products are available in the various languages of the partnership, available for free download (PDF documents) at the project’s web-site: www.YCARE.eu.

In these guidelines we start with a short overview on the topic of radicalisation (1.2) and the need for a pedagogical approach (1.3). We then explain shortly the role of youth counselling in Europe (1.4) and the needs of Youth counsellors on the topic of radicalisation (1.5). In the scope of this project it is not possible to answer to all the needs mentioned. We conclude with the YCARE contribution.
1.2 Radicalisation in Europe today

In recent years, radicalisation towards violent extremist and terrorist positions has posed an increasing threat in the area of the European Union (EU). Recent terrorist attacks (e.g. the Jihadist attacks in Spain, United-Kingdom, France and Belgium) and the increase of young people participating and sympathising with this and other kind of extremist orientation groups (e.g. ultranationalists, Neo-nazis) and other forms of violence and intolerance (e.g. juvenile gangs, hooliganism, xenophobia, islamophobia, hate crimes addressed to ethnic minorities, homophobia and juvenile gender violence) (ECRI, 2014; Ramalingan, 2014) has placed the issue of radicalisation as a priority and a challenge on the political agenda.

Policies in the EU are addressed to co-ordinate action of the civilian population and public authorities aimed at detection and early assistance. In its Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (2015), the EU emphasises the significance of this co-operation in addition to the exchange of good practices. It further points out that radicalisation is not limited to Islamist groups.

We can find some examples of policies inspired by this approach in countries like Denmark (Prevention of Radicalisation and Extremism Action Plan) and the United Kingdom (PREVENT and CHANNEL). These policies are focussed on community action. In certain cases attention for radicalisation has resulted in stigmatisation of the Muslim community, which reflects the need to train professionals, civilians and public authorities on this issue.

In several European countries action frameworks have been implemented to tackle extremism and radicalisation. These policies typically include assistance hotlines and professional networks. Their aims are to co-ordinate professionals and public authorities and to orientate them towards detection and support in early stages of radicalisation. We can find examples in Germany (Beratungsstelle Radikalisierung), Spain (Plan Nacional de Lucha Contra la Radicalización Violenta), the Netherlands (Actie Programma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme) and the Slovak Republic (Strategy on Countering Extremism in the Slovak Republic for the period of 2015-2019).

Apart from these initiatives born in the field of citizen safety, programmes have been initiated that are targeted at youth and frontline agents. Erasmus + is an important actor in these programmes. It is one of the main initiative precursors in the field of formal and non-formal education at European level. Examples of Erasmus + projects are Conundrum of Exclusion: Training Course on Preventing Radicalisation of Young People - which aims at empowerment, inclusion and social cohesion through a network of enterprises; and Team Up for Neets: Youth Employability that aims to enhance non-formal education, sports and employability.

In European countries we identified several initiatives dealing with radicalisation and extremism in the education field. In Austria for example, apart from the specific subject of “political awareness” (transversal to the education curricula), high-impact and visibility workshops implemented by the Polis centre dealing with issues such as
extremism and de-radicalisation can be found. Another interesting Project is the Plan of prevention of radicalism among young people from Ceuta and Melilla (Spain) addressed to foster the detection of vulnerable adolescents’ emotional profiles by the Teaching staff.

Several organisations and groups of Islamic worship have also implemented different initiatives in response to radicalisation and aimed at raising awareness about the role played by the Muslim religion regarding its prevention. Some examples of these actions are the workshops carried out by young Muslim groups in Austria (MJÖ) or the several conferences and seminars organised in Spain (UCIDE, Unión de Comunidades Islámicas De España) as well as the Irish web page www.jihad.info.

Apart from programmes that foster prevention and early detection, initiatives can be found that are aimed at intervention. These initiatives deal with persons who have already been radicalised and want to leave the extremist group they are linked with (de-radicalisation). Examples are the Exit-Germany and Exit-Hayat programmes in Germany. The Exit-Germany programme is an initiative with high impact at international level that provides assistance during the de-radicalisation process of young people who are affiliated to ultra-right groups. The Hayat-Germany programme on its side also provides assistance in the case of de-radicalisation; this programme is aimed at young radical Salafists and Jihadists.
1.3 A pedagogical approach

In explaining the process of radicalisation among young people the emphasis in the literature is on social and psychological factors. The emphasis is on problems around finding meaning and identity, as well as on experienced injustice and threats to people’s own ethnic, religious or cultural group. Such factors can evoke negative emotions like anger or fear which can translate into negative intentions and attitudes or even violent behavior. To this day, there has been less focus on the pedagogical roots of such socio-psychological phenomena. However, there are sufficient indications that education risks and protective factors can be identified that are highly relevant for prevention. Besides, pedagogical interventions can take the form of a symptomatic treatment for persons who have already entered the radicalisation process.

This chapter gives an overview of the insights provided by the literature on this subject. The first section will deal with risks at home. Next we will focus on risks in other pedagogical contexts. To conclude with the pedagogical responsibilities of various actors who may influence the development of young people will be highlighted.

1.3.1 Risks at home

**Education for equality vs. mistrust of "the other":**

A recent study (Van Bergen & Pels, 2013) shows that there is a relationship between radicalisation and ‘ethnic socialization’. Ethnic socialization is the way educators consciously accompany children in dealing with others, eg. religious and ethnic groups. Educating with the message that everyone is equal, regardless of background, can be a protective factor. Parents who teach children to have a distrustful stand with respect to ‘the other’ can therefore (un)consciously give input to processes of radicalisation - although this is certainly not always the case (Van Bergen & Pels, 2013).

The relationship between ethnic socialization and radicalisation is demonstrated in various studies. Gielen (2008), for instance, indicated that at first right-wing youngsters share their xenophobic and nationalistic views with their parents. Only when they come into contact with justice, parents think they have overstepped the mark. Correspondingly, a study to hardcore youth (Van Donselaar, 2005) shows that hardcore extremists share their anti-immigrant sentiments with their parents.
Uncertainty about religious/cultural identity

Young people report a lack of support from their parents in the development of their religious / cultural identity. One problem is that parents often lack adequate resources. Parents often have no answer to the ‘why’ questions about religious commandments and prohibitions (King, 2008). Parents are not always able to guide their children in the process of religious meaning and identity development which may contribute to the process of radicalisation (Wessels & Dijkman, 2012). The experienced stigma and exclusion as for example a Muslim entails new challenges for educators of children. How to help children with bullying related to the Ramadan or the headscarf? And how to deal with the resulting feelings of harm?

Uncertainty to act on signs of radicalisation

Qualitative studies among radicalized youth show that parents sometimes espouse the same ideas as their children. But more often they are inclined to play down or look away from extreme manifestations of their children. They do not start a dialogue, do not reflect or counterbalance (Van Bergen & Pels, 2013. From San et al. 2010). The literature further reports a perceived parental lack of competence in dealing with polarization, stigmatization and tension, and indicates also that the parents are often unaware of the impact of their own position.

Parental resistance can both strengthen and weaken the motivation to become an active member of an extreme group (Van der Valk & Wagenaar, 2010). Emotional reactions by parents can trigger further radicalisation especially when fights are involved. But intervention by parents can also evoke awareness in their children of the undesirable consequences of their behavior. Thus parents can motivate their children to exit the radical group.

Parenting Style

Open reactions to questions and problems of children by parents can provide a buffer against radicalisation (Bergen & Pels, 2013). Authoritarian parenting and a lack of responsiveness constitutes a risk factor. Often there is a communication gap and perceived lack of emotional support from the family, also when it comes to their search for (religious) sense of purpose and identity. Certainly less educated parents of the first generation immigrants see less the relevance of interactive communication with children from an early age (Pels et al. 2009).

Parents may adopt a different style towards boys and girls respectively. From the general literature on education in the context of migration it is known, especially in families of first generation Moroccans and Turks, that the educational attention for boys is decreasing after reaching puberty (Pels et al. 2009). Thus the street and internet socialization by peers can often dominate, good but also evil can more easily take over. By contrast, the older girls get a reduced space for their self-determination and self-fulfillment, the pressure to conform and to take care tasks increases. Wessels and Dijkman (2012) show in their study among orthodox Muslim women that the latter is an important element in the breeding ground for radicalisation among young women.

It is not only immigrant parents who endorse an authoritarian parenting style. Research on right-wing extremism shows that youth whose parents endorse an authoritarian and disciplinary parenting style are more likely to develop a skeptical and negative attitude towards immigrants. This increases the likelihood of adopting radical viewpoints (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2010).
Family Circumstances

Multiple problems in families can reinforce the powerlessness of parents and educators, as is known from many studies. In addition, multiple problems (family conflicts, violence, psychosocial issues) can be an immediate breeding ground for radicalisation (Wessels & Dijkman, 2012).

Strong family problems can constitute an ideal breeding ground for radicalisation, in particular if these problems decrease the attention for what bothers youngsters in an existential sense. The lack of both protection and boundaries often intensifies youngsters quest for identity. Radical groups understand this phenomenon and make use of the confusion to recruit new members (Sieckelinck & De Winter, 2015).

In line with this, a study to adherents to various strong ideologies - peaceful squatters, animal right activists, far-right Nazi-sympathizers and sympathizers of extreme versions of Islam - demonstrates that adolescents with radical opinions are likely to have experienced a difficult childhood. More than half of the interviewees of this study came from a single-parent household and many were raised in public schools with lower than average school results (Sieckelinck et al., 2015).

1.3.2 Risks in other pedagogical contexts

Educational mission of the school

Pels (2012) notes from the literature that schools are struggling with their educational mission, let alone a crystallized vision on dealing with diversity and conflict and tensions in ethnic, cultural and / or religious grounds. "Intercultural education" is remained a relatively unaddressed issue (Ledoux et al., 2000). In line with this, few schools adequately hop about with extreme manifestations and signs of radicalisation among young people. In fact, we see similar reactions when parents punish (sometimes to suspension) to extreme behavior, lack of responsiveness and tend to look away or too late to respond to the threat of radicalisation of young people. Young people have nowhere to go with their ideas. With the risk that they turn away from school and resort for instance to the internet where they further radicalize.

Very often schools have a notion of a safe environment that does not include safe talk about politics and ideals (Sieckelinck et al., 2015). However, from a perspective on radicalisation the school should be a place where students can talk about politics and ideals. This implies that such talk should not be avoided out of fear for offending a person or a group. It can be stated that in safe places turbulence has to be created to reveal what is going on in the minds of young people and to resolve their problems. Although it may be difficult for teachers to address sensitive political issues, schools have to acknowledge that in a safe school there should be space for open discussion.

According to Sieckelinck and De Ruyter (2009), educational attention should be given to young people’s ideals. In their vision it is no option to counter radicalisation by discouraging people to be passionate about their ideals. Rather awareness should be created of the way in which individuals dedicate themselves to ideals and guidance should be provided. It is important for people to have ideals: they limit the options of individuals, which enables them to make their own choices, to take action and to be satisfied.

It is an important educational aim to educate children to become reasonable passionate about ideals. This aim rests upon three criteria: rationality, morality and prudence. Young people should be taught to take a rational,
moral, and prudent stance toward their ideals and that they pursue their ideals in a way limited (yet also enabled) by rational, moral and prudent consideration.

**Pedagogical mission of houses of worship**

Participatory research with Muslim youth shows that in addition to the family, the pedagogy in the mosque (schools) is also insufficient for their needs (Pels, the Gruijter & Lahri 2008). Again, there is a situation of authoritarian relationships and one-way communication and knowledge transfer. There is little room for interaction and (critical) reflection with the students. In addition, the Mosque offers little support in bridging the gap between the different worlds in which children live. The main objective is to form and strengthen their own (religious) identity in children, and thus the links with the country of origin and the ethnic community. Building a bridge to society is less important. There are certain mosques and imams who are more open to young people and their needs, and they also open their doors to women and girls (Pels et al., 2008). But it also cannot be ruled out, that in some mosque schools an anti-integration message can be heard.

Leaders of Christian houses of worship can bring people to extremist viewpoints as regards pro-life issues. Anti-abortion organizations are trying to engage the clergy in its fight against abortion (Priests for Life, 2016). Although it is certainly not the case that calls for mobilization against abortion necessarily makes people anti-abortion extremists such calls can be a trigger factor in the radicalization process of individuals.

**Pedagogical civil society**

Recently the focus on the pedagogical responsibility of institutions outside the family and school is growing: youth work, social services, institutions in the judicial system, as well as informal networks and voluntary organizations become aware of their potential role. However, in this line of work there occurs quite some pedagogical impotence, for example with regard to moral education, dealing with aggression, lack of binding of young people in school and society and with conflicts on an ethnic / religious basis. The consequence of this is ultimately, that less social support is available for families and young people involved, while social support precisely is one of the most important protective factors.
1.3.3 Pedagogical task

Communication with and support for young people in the event of conflicts over ethnicity or faith seem to have a protective effect against negative thinking about ‘the other’. Parents can thus play an important role. This concerns both the quality of the pedagogical relationship with their children and, more specifically, to the education of their children in their attitudes towards other groups in society. If young people in their search for self and meaning have too few adults who give them personal attention and open discussion, that may contribute to radicalisation. Parents with little “information capital” can even contribute, by offering a listening ear and, if necessary, to seek assistance.

Support of parents is needed in building a positive relationship and communication with their children. There is now a wide range of projects designed to assist parents in promoting the cognitive and academic development of their children. The emphasis is very much on the ‘how’ and less on ‘which we educate” such as the importance of an open and reflexive communication for guiding adolescent youth in their search for meaning and identity, commitment to society, dealing with diversity and conflicting values. Additional modules are required for educational interventions that specifically address these issues.

Not only among parents but also wider, their communities, awareness is needed of the risks of bringing in distrust ‘the other’. There are also risks when reciprocal communication with children is ab-sent, when people look away and (critical) reflection on extreme manifestations does not exist. The possible negative effects on young people, and therefore the pedagogical responsibility involving this, is hardly addressed.

Also co-educators in voluntary / professional institutions responsible for youth must take responsibility. In education, more attention is needed for the (moral) education of young people, their questions about meaning, their religious location and as citizens, their dealings with ‘the other’. In extreme manifestations of behavior there must be a way to make room for critical reflection and corrective action. Also professionals in other sectors should be given more attention to the struggle of educators and young people with questions and problems of polarization and radicalisation. There is attention needed to support and professionalization of professionals in learning to deal with the other and with the tensions and moral dilemmas raised by this.

Further reading


1.4 Youth counselling in Europe

Young people need an information framework that enables them to make their first crucial decisions of great impact in the long term, at all levels (educational, vocational, family and personal). Youth counselling services respond to this need with the help of various practitioners ("counsellors and advisors") and centres which offer global and comprehensive counselling and information in areas such as education, employment, health, etc.

In the category of youth counselling services we have to distinguish between generalist and specialised services.

Generalist counselling services are aimed to provide basic information and counselling in various areas of interest for the young people (e.g. education, health, employment or housing) and to direct, if necessary, to specialised services in these fields (e.g. direct to drug treatment centre for addict young people). Although, they use to offer numerous resources and recreational activities to young people, as well as vocational training.

On the other side, specialised youth counselling services feature their integration into several fields (educative, health, social welfare or juvenile justice among others) and unlike generalist services, provide specific in-depth guidance in these areas (e.g. educational and vocational guidance).

**Generalist counselling**

At European level, the ERYICA Agency (European Youth Information and Counselling Agency) is the umbrella organisation of this kind of generalist service. Its main purpose is to meet the needs of information of young population and enhance cooperation in this field. At present, it coordinates more than 7,500 local and regional centers, reflecting the broad distribution of this kind of generalist services all around Europe.

In Austria and Slovenia we can find generalist centres that offer basic information and counselling to families attending these services to solve questions and receive support (counselling and Family centres respectively) without the need to be previously directed from other services. In other partners countries of this Project youth centres provide similar services, such as the Instituto de la Juventud in Spain, Advice on Wire in Austria or Youth work in Ireland among others.

**Specialist counselling**

The highest number of services in general are found in the field of formal education. The educative guidance services integrated into school establishments deal with aspects related mainly with academic achievement and the relation with the educative community (e.g. the Advisory service and School counsellors in Slovenia, the educative counselling teams in Spain, Greece and Slovak Republic or the School psychology platform in Austria).
Along this line, we can also find resources targeted to families where to get information and solve queries. (Families school in Spain).

The treatment of non-formal aspects (e.g. education in values, social abilities or healthy lifestyle among others) uses to be carried out by external organisations (e.g. Foróige in Ireland and several NGOs in Spain) or education programmes (not transversals to the education curricula) provided to school establishments (e.g. Plan for coexistence in Spain).

In these fields such as Health, Justice, Employment or Social welfare, youth support is more specialised and addressed to young people from specific groups such as migrants, minors under the guardianship of the administration or minor offenders, among others. In these areas it does not tend to be a counsellor figure recognised as such, but counselling activities integrated into the existing programmes implemented by each professional (e.g. educative and vocational guidance, counselling to minor offenders, etc.).
1.5 What youth counsellors need

The YCARE project conducted a needs assessment among professionals in eight European countries. The specific needs collected are detailed hereafter, making a distinction between the needs of professionals and other needs. The YCARE project is aimed at the needs of professionals.

1.5.1 Needs focused on professionals

Information

- To provide information about political and religious pluralism.
- To raise awareness towards xenophobic behaviours and intolerance in general. To inform and raise awareness on the phenomenon of radicalisation (history, process, types of extremist ideologies, differences between religion and fundamentalism, risk factors) and how to connect with vulnerable or radicalised young people.

Capacity-building

- Techniques of intervention with families and community to encourage their involvement and protect from risk environments.
- Specific strategies and techniques to deal with radicalisation: how to prevent it, how to distinguish indicators (e.g. orthodoxy vs. fundamentalism) and what to do once detected.
- Conversational techniques (group and individual) and strategies to implement it in the course of routine group work.
- Refresh practitioners’ abilities (emotional intelligence, conflict solving, social abilities, etc.).
- Training in ICT and social networks to get closer to reality and understand the new environments of social interaction of young population.
- Strategies and techniques to promote youth empowerment.

Specific training resources

- Training Web platform: usefulness of the platform model for the exchange of knowledge and e-learning purpose.
- Transversal tools: to provide techniques and materials that can be applied by practitioners in their daily activity.
Specific guidelines and handbooks about radicalisation offering a strategic framework and a practical approach.

Assistance hotlines to make consultations regarding queries and particular cases.

Didactic materials (data sheets, activity cards, etc.) to put into practice several techniques.

Training courses and personal coaching within the organisation.

1.5.2 Other needs

The YCARE project aims at first-line professionals working with youth. However, several other needs are mentioned by professionals that should be mentioned. They are aimed at the youth themselves and at institutions:

- **Youth empowerment**: Enhance youth involvement in decision making. Provide young people with the opportunity to choose, organise and implement their own activities (concerts, football matches, etc.).

- **Cultural inclusion**: Organise intercultural and family coexistence activities (e.g. during religious celebrations) also with religious/cultural representatives; importance of the cultural mediators figure at school; organise cultural trips.

- **Arts projects**: Encourage the development of cultural projects and activities intended to involve young people directly and enhance team working and creativity (e.g. videos direction, design and management of a cultural agenda).

- **Counselling and primary care services**: create more resources and services directed to families mainly to provide early stage care, without requiring to be referred previously.

- **Professionals’ networks**: to view and create professionals’ networks to improve communication and the exchange of experiences.

- **State and civil Community dialogue**: to establish an open and transparent dialogue among the State and the general Population (Youth especially) where citizenship issues can be debated.
1.6 What YCARE and other projects can do

In the scope of this project it is not possible to answer to all the needs mentioned. The project contributes to capacity building and training-resources only in a limited way: the project itself does not include training in professional techniques and coaching. It does provide activities which may be useful in the practice of youth counselling and it provides insight in various anti-radicalisation strategies. However, apart from YCARE, several other European projects have been carried out that deal with radicalisation. Some notable projects are RAN, TERRA, the Council of Europe toolkit for local authorities and IMPACT Europe. These projects will be described below to make professionals aware of their existence. After that we can clarify the added value of YCARE.

1.6.1 European projects

The Radicalisation Awareness Network

The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) is a network of frontline practitioners from around Europe who work with people who have already been radicalised, or who are vulnerable to radicalisation. RAN connects various actors in the field, from first-line practitioners to local authorities and academics. RAN is structured around thematic working groups that all have another focus. These working groups are organised around the following themes: communication and narratives; education; exit; youth, families and communities; local authorities; prison and probation; police and law enforcement; remembrance of victims of terrorism and; health and social care.

The RAN Centre of Excellence provides several forms of support. Following a request from an EU Member State, the RAN Centre of Excellence may deploy a RAN advisory team. This type of support may be valuable for national authorities revising a national strategy, reviewing a relevant policy area, developing a key project plan or building a national network/coordination Hub. The RAN Centre of Excellence will help organise and report on the support. Also, it may run a train-the-trainer course. Knowledge is passed over in a two-day train-the-trainer course that will equip participants to lead a one-day workshop on awareness and action for colleagues. Finally, the RAN Centre of Excellence may organise a workshop on a specific topic for a group of Member States. Workshops address current themes and difficulties relevant to the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism.

On the RAN website, a collection of approaches and practices can be found. As described on the website, this collection should be considered as a practical, evolving and growing tool, where practitioners, first liners and policy makers may draw in inspiration from; find examples adaptable to their local/specific context, and identify counterparts to exchange on prevention experiences.

Terrorism and Radicalisation (TERRA)

TERRA is a European project that aims to reinforce the positive role victims and former terrorists can play in relation to the prevention of radicalisation and providing practical guidance to specific target groups. As described on the TERRA website, target groups and beneficiaries include victims, (potential) terrorists, EU member states and frontline-workers in the field of law-enforcement, rehabilitation, teaching, welfare and social workers, journalists, policy makers, and religious leaders. The program is meant for both prevention and learning.

The TERRA website mentions the following results of the project:

- Network coverage in all member states (in close cooperation with the Network of Associations of Victims of Terrorism NAVT and the Radicalisation Awareness Network RAN).
- Overview and description of methods and approaches for instance, to screen victims, recognize signs of radicalisation and advice to enhance the rehabilitation of terrorists.
- Manual with recommendations for a broad group of front-liners: teachers, prison warders, policemen, social and youth workers, journalists and policy makers.
- Guidance for journalists and policy makers
- Education packages for schools.

TERRA is now in its second phase. In the first phase the TERRA toolkit was realized. This toolkit with manuals for specific groups of front-line practitioners can be consulted on the TERRA website: http://www.terra-net.eu/

Organising Intercultural and Interreligious Activities: a Toolkit for Local Authorities

This toolkit has been prepared by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. It aims to equip local authorities sufficiently to deal with interreligious or intercultural dialogue. Such dialogue can serve as a good resources to build more inclusive societies. Also, measures that include the promotion of intercultural and religious dialogue are important in preventing radicalisation at grassroots level. The toolkit consists of the following elements:

- Leaflet about the toolkit;
- 12 principles of interfaith dialogue at local level;
- Guidelines for local and regional authorities on preventing radicalisation and manifestations of hate at the grassroots level;
- Four digital resource info-sheets giving access to the information online, via a QR code:
  - factsheet on relevant texts of the Council of Europe, Congress and other bodies;
  - factsheet on the key academic work carried out in this field;
  - factsheet on relevant university curricula and training courses in Europe;
  - factsheet on existing good practices.

The toolkit is available on the project's website in 36 languages of the Council of Europe member states: http://www.coe.int/t/congress/files/topics/toolkit/default_en.asp

IMPACT Europe

IMPACT Europe is developing an evaluation toolkit for anti-radicalisation measures. IMPACT attempts contribute to the ongoing efforts within Europe to establish what works in tackling violent radicalisation. The aim of the
The IMPACT evaluation toolkit draws on a state-of-the-art knowledge database on radicalisation factors, existing counter violent radicalisation interventions, and approaches to evaluating these interventions. Making the database easily accessible to a wide range of public and voluntary sector users, the toolkit is ultimately geared at encouraging practitioners to properly evaluate their counter violent radicalisation activities and to build good practices into the design of any future interventions.

For more information, see: http://impacteurope.eu/

1.6.2 The YCARE project

In contrast to the projects mentioned above, YCARE starts from a pedagogical point of view. As such it has a unique approach.

Guidelines

These Guidelines provide information about the process of radicalisation, the factors underlying this, the role of radical organisations and their use of digital media. Special attention is given to the relation between radicalisation and education. Descriptions of the most important radical currents in Europe - radical Islam, the extreme right and the extreme left are also covered by the handbook. One part of the handbook is dedicated to guidelines to inform about targeted youth support. In this part strategies are addressed that are employed to help vulnerable young people early to address their difficulties and to prevent their problems from escalating. Attention is paid to early detection strategies, prevention strategies, intervention strategies and exit strategies.

Toolbox

The toolbox created consists of three separated boxes. In the first box we will store activities. This box contains training material in the form of exercises for immediate use in an educational context. The activities can be used for prevention ends but may also be useful in a setting in which counsellors work with radicalised youth.

The second box stores good practices. In countries such as the Netherlands and Germany many successful initiatives have been realised that contribute to combatting radicalisation. The good practices show what kind of efforts are undertaken in radicalisation prevention and intervention. They serve as a source of inspiration for further development of counter-radicalisation programs in countries all over Europe.

The third box stores awareness raising material such as: general tools, multimedia tools, promotional materials. This material will help professionals to gain more insight in the phenomenon of radicalisation. In addition to the YCARE handbook, the material in the third box will help professionals in detecting radicalisation.
Online Platform and Mobile Applications

An online platform and mobile applications are created to support the delivery of the outputs of the projects. The platform and applications facilitate interaction between learners and trainers. It supports electronic management, storage and presentation of materials and thus create the conditions necessary for a dynamic teaching environment.
2. Understanding radicalisation
2. Understanding radicalisation

2.1. Introduction

In the following paragraphs, information on radicalisation will be provided. The needs assessment showed that professionals need information on the phenomenon of radicalisation and the factors underlying this.

First the phenomenon of radicalisation will be discussed. In this paragraph characteristics of a radical person and controversies around the definition of radicalisation will be explained. Next, the so called staircase to terrorism will be presented to gain more insight in the stages a radicalising person goes through. The model visualizes the process of radicalisation by the means of a metaphor of a staircase. Paragraph 2.4 is all about trigger factors in the radicalisation process. Trigger factors are concrete events that initiate identifiable radicalisation or de-radicalisation. In paragraph 2.5 a distinction will be made between various types of radical persons. As will become clear, persons with a certain radical profile are more or less sensitive for certain trigger factors. The subsequent paragraph is about the way in which radical persons operate. Attention will be paid to the organisation structures of radical groups as well as on persons who self-radicalize: the lone wolves. Paragraph 2.7 deals with radical thought across Europe. In this chapter radical ideologies will be discussed, such as the radical extreme-right, the radical extreme-left and radical Islam.
Definitions of radicalisation are manifold. This is largely due to its use in the political arena where definitions are used to motivate policy choices. Academic definitions often seem to be coloured by the specific discipline. In this chapter the term radicalisation and the controversy related to it are explored. As a starting point we quote the definition formulated by Schmid which is used in another European project called TERRA (www.terratoolkit.eu):

"An individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from the mainstream or status quo –oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate."

This definition combines a lot of aspects that are more or less partially referred to in other definitions:

- It is an individual process as well as a group process, so psychological and social factors should be taken into account.
- It is characterised by the rejection of the legitimacy of the existing order.
- It can lead to non-violent tactics as well as to violent or terrorist acts.
- It contains processes of ideological/social isolation from society and dichotomous world views.
- It is essentially a process of change, increasingly justifying commitment to intergroup conflict.

The first aspect mentioned here is not quiet controversial. Most people agree that radicalisation should be understood as a process. It is not something that happens overnight. Nor is radicalisation a linear process. Development from susceptibility to radical thought to a terrorist act does not take place gradually: sometimes the process proceeds slowly, sometimes it goes fast. It is also possible that someone returns to earlier stages, e.g. a person exploring radical thought who returns to the stage of being susceptible for radical thought (Feddes, Nichelson & Doosje, 2015)
Controversy exists as regards the endpoints of radicalisation. Does the term ‘radical’ refer to a particular mindset or is it necessarily related to conducting radical activities? In this connection a distinction is made between cognitive radicalisation and behavioural radicalisation. Cognitive radicalisation refers to political ideas that are incompatible with core democratic principles. Among these ideas one could place various forms or racial or religious supremacy and ideologies that deny basic rights or democratic principles. Behavioural radicalisation refers to the often violent or coercive actions resulting from radical ideas. To speak of behavioural radicalisation people should not only develop particular beliefs but should also be involved in unlawful acts (Neumann, 2013).

The term ‘radical’ has no meaning on its own since the content of radical thought is context depended. What is called radical depends on what is considered mainstream in a given society. It might be the case that from one point of view someone is radicalising while from another this person is going progressive. The political system plays a role in this: in non-democratic societies people who strive for free speech and other liberal-democratic rights are labelled as radical while the opposite applies to modern Europe (Neumann, 2013).

The aspect of rejecting the legitimacy of the existing order in the TERRA definition is mirrored in the National Counterterrorism Strategy of the Dutch Government (NCTV, 2016) in which radicalisation is described as a process toward extremism or even terrorism. Extremism is defined as “the phenomenon whereby individuals or groups from an ideological motive are willing to seriously violate the law or to engage in activities which undermine the democratic order.” Terrorism is defined as follows: “Committing violence aimed at human lives or causing society disrupting damage to property, with the aim of social subversion and destabilization, causing fear in the population or influencing political decisions.”

Both extremism and terrorism are ideologically motivated. The ideological motive can be religiously inspired but this is not necessary the case. Terrorism has more impact than extremism. It entails the loss of lives or damage to material things that is so severe that social stability will suffer and is committed with the aim of influencing political decision-making. So the ambition of terrorists is always far-reaching and political in nature (NCTV, 2016).

Understanding a religion or a doctrine is not enough if we want to understand radicalisation into violent extremism. Many terrorists are not especially pious and have only a cursory understanding of the radical religious ideology they claim to adhere to (Borum, 2011). Exemplary is the phenomenon ‘cut and paste Islam’. Many young Muslims don’t have a solid understanding of Islam. They constitute their own Islam on the basis of single Koran texts and create their own truth through an extremist explanation. Their ideas are strongly influenced by radical beliefs on the internet or the beliefs that are spread by radical imams or unofficial radical preachers. These Muslim radicals preach a self-composed religion that has not much to do with the religion that is adhered to by a large majority of Muslims worldwide (AIVD, 2006).

Further reading


2.3 Staircase to terrorism: Stages of the radicalisation process

The ‘staircase model’ of Moghaddam (2005) explains on the basis of psychological factors why only a small minority of dissatisfied people in society ends up as a terrorist. In this paragraph we follow his publication. The model shows that the radicalisation process should not be understood as a smooth continuum of complete disengagement with radicalism to the most extreme end point of terrorism; rather people climb on a staircase.

The staircase model is based on a metaphor of a staircase in a building with five floors. The staircase becomes narrower which symbolizes that there are fewer people located on the higher floors than on the ground floor. On the ground floor are the people who have not yet entered the radicalisation process. When they are confronted with problems, they may climb to a higher floor. At the top of the building are the people who are willing to commit terrorist attacks. They have gone through the radicalisation process from beginning to end. On each floor of the building, certain psychological processes play a role that are associated with the choice of whether or not to climb to a higher floor. These processes will be discussed below.

The people on the ground floor experience injustice and frustration. Underlying reasons may be economic or political circumstances or threats to personal or collective identity. Their frustration largely stems from perceived deprivation, rather than actual deprivation. In addition, their dissatisfaction is more frequently related to the situation of the group to which they belong than to their personal situation. Most people on the ground floor do not turn their feelings into action, but some do so and climb one floor higher.

On the first floor, individuals search for opportunities to do something about the incorrect treatment they experience. Two psychological factors in particular may influence their behaviour: opportunities for personal mobility and perceptions of procedural injustice. The more people are under the impression that they have no opportunities to move to a higher social scale, the more they will be inclined to climb to the next floor. Besides, a perceived lack of opportunities to influence decision-making may be a reason for radicalisation.

On the second floor, frustrations and fears which result from a disability to improve the situation lead to a quest for someone to blame. On the second floor individuals project their aggression on a common ‘enemy’, like the United States or the Western world. Individuals who actively seek opportunities to carry out acts of aggression will eventually leave the second floor. They climb further to take action against the perceived enemy.

The third floor is the floor of moral commitment. On this floor people start to consider terrorist organisations as a shadow world. In this shadow world a parallel morality exists that justifies a struggle in which an ideal society is sought with all possible means. From the perspective of terrorist organisations, terrorists are moral persons, while
the hostile government lacks moral commitment. The persons who are on the third floor are persuaded by terrorist organisations to join them.

The people on the fourth floor become a member of a terrorist organisation. In most cases, they are recruited as members for a longer period of time. They often become a member of a cell of four or five persons, in which they have solely access to information about the other members of their own cell. In addition, people can be recruited as “foot soldiers” who carry out violent (suicide) acts.

On the fifth floor, individuals learn to sidestep the inhibitory mechanisms that could deter them from committing a terrorist act. On this floor they learn to label civilians members of the out-group so that these civilians become part of “the enemy”. Individuals on the fifth floor divide the world into “us” versus “them”, which justifies that civilians become a target of violence. They believe that every person who is not actively resisting the government may be attacked.

In the case of open struggle the weaker party usually surrenders when he or she observes that the battle is decided. These signs of surrender may curb the aggression of the “winner.” However, victims of terrorist attacks are seldom aware of the danger lurking prior to the attack. As a consequence, they won’t show signals that may prevent an attack by a change in the terrorist’s mindset.

From his staircase model, Moghaddam (2005) distracts a number of policy recommendations that in his vision contribute to a long-term solution to terrorism. First, he stresses the importance of preventive measures. After all, as long as the ground floor is full of people who consider themselves victims of unjust conditions, it can be expected that some of them will climb to a higher floor. In this situation, any terrorist who is arrested will get a successor in no time. Additionally, Moghaddam emphasizes the importance of democratic institutions. By facilitating participation and mobility, the injustice underlying radicalisation is being removed. In this context, Moghaddam points out that it is important to promote equal opportunities in educational as well as in the professional and political domains.

Moghaddam also highlights the role of education in fighting us-versus-them thinking. As people continue to climb the staircase, their categorization of the world in us versus them becomes more prominent and rigid. It must
be prevented that thinking in rigid categories becomes a new standard at grass roots level. After all, this would imply an increased risk of radicalisation.

Finally, Moghaddam suggests that parties should enter into dialogue with each other more often in order to promote mutual understanding. He states that more contact should be sought with extreme groups. In the past it has become clear that dialogue can bring these groups into the mainstream political process. In this context, Moghaddam also emphasizes the importance of increased intercultural understanding. In the current situation, non-Western perspectives are often not sufficiently taken into account, for example when formulating universal values. With dialogue this cause for radicalisation can disappear into the background.

**Further reading**

2.4 Trigger factors in the radicalisation process

At the base of the radicalisation process can be several factors: experiencing relative deprivation, identity-related factors such as discrimination and integration, uncertainty and perceived physical or symbolic threat. These underlying factors (root factors) are in varying degrees important for various groups of radicals. They constitute the psychological and structural conditions that underlie the process of radicalisation (Falcon & Wagenaar, 2010, Feddes, Nickolson & Box, 2015). We follow the description of Feddes, Nickolson and Doosje (2015).

As opposed to underlying factors trigger factors are often decisive in the radicalisation process (Feddes, Nickolson and Doosje, 2015). Trigger factors are concrete events (e.g., incidents, problems, choices) that initiate identifiable (further) (de-)radicalisation. They may refer to turning points or catalysts. Events that serve as a turning point put a radicalisation process in motion or reverse this process (de-radicalisation). Events that serve as a catalyst accelerate or decelerate the radicalisation or de-radicalisation process. Trigger factors thus can effectuate a change in both the direction and the speed of the radicalisation process. In the section below some common trigger factors will be described.

2.4.1 Trigger factors at micro-level: private sphere

In the private sphere events can take place that result in a personal crisis that is associated with an increased susceptibility to radicalisation. One such event is confrontation with death. Someone who is confronted with e.g. the death of a loved one is more likely to start a quest for meaning and identity and becomes more susceptible to ideological messages. Problems at home, such as quarrels, divorces and conflicts can also trigger radicalisation. A bad situation at home can evoke feelings of depression and loneliness. In such circumstances a radical ideology can become more attractive.

Another trigger factor concerns loss of (perspective on) work or school. People who lose their job or people who quit school may start a quest for identity and meaning, culminating in radicalisation. Direct confrontations with discrimination can also trigger radicalisation: someone who is confronted with discrimination, racism or exclusion is more likely to develop negative emotions. The same is true for people who experience negative interactions with authorities. Persons who get in touch with the intelligence service, the police and the judiciary can experience a lack of confidence, frustration, anger, disappointment, disgust, anxiety, helplessness and fear. Detention can also serve as a trigger factor. Someone who is put into jail may find in this event a confirmation for his hostile worldview and is confronted with new uncertainties with radicalisation as the final result.
2.4.2 Trigger factors at meso-level: group dynamics

A break of social bonds can be a trigger factor at meso-level. Social bonds are found in schools, sports clubs and the family. Breaking these bonds can lead to a quest for meaning and can strengthen the bond with a radical group. Someone’s radicalisation process can also be triggered through contact with a radical person. Meetings with charismatic people or spiritual leaders can take the form of a catalyst or turning point in the radicalisation process. Joining a radical group is one of the most important trigger factors. Radical groups play an important role in the radicalisation process because of the human need for social bonding. Activities by radical groups can strengthen social strong bonds in a short time up to the extent that these bonds are as strong as the bonds found within a family.

Another trigger factor is marrying a (non)radical person. It is plausible that the (non) radical thoughts of someone's partner influence one’s own (non)radical thinking. Besides, some terrorists receive physical training and/or ideological education in a training camp. Mutual bonds are reinforced during these camps and participants may be forced to take an oath. This in fact ensures that there is no way back anymore. A final trigger factor at meso-level is confrontation with propaganda. Propaganda responds to the human need for black-and-white thinking, with the result that this need becomes even stronger.

2.4.3 Trigger factors at macro-level: actual events

At macro-level calls for action from radical organisation can trigger the radicalisation process. A general call from a radical organisation may stimulate people in an advanced stage of the radicalisation process to actually join the fight. A call can be considered an exit opportunity by people who perceive a lack of action perspective. In addition to calls to action attacks on one’s group are seen as a trigger factor. Examples are: military action, arrests and cartoons against one’s group. Government policies can also affect someone’s radical thought. Public policies focussed on one’s own group or on radicalisation in general can have a counterproductive effect an serve as trigger factors. The use of violence by the government to prevent protests or social change can evoke feelings of revenge. Terrorist action can be the result.

Further reading

2.5 Profiles of radicalising youth

As regards the decision for an intervention it may be relevant to investigate to what extent the person in question coincides with one of the following types: identity seeker, justice seeker, significance seeker and thrill seeker. This typology enables professionals to grasp the motivations of radicalising people to effectively intervene if deemed necessary. We follow the description of Feddes, Nickolson and Doosje (2015):

Identity seeker

Identity seekers are supposed to be vulnerable to specific trigger factors that are related to identity and social binding. Most people feel a strong desire to belong to a group. An individual can derive self-confidence from the group and thus the group can reduce uncertainty that events in life present. Some persons feel a stronger need for a positive identity than others which makes them more vulnerable to radicalisation.

Justice seeker

Some radicals are mainly motivated by the high degree of injustice they experience in relation to themselves and/or their group. They need an outlet for their frustrations and are looking for recognition and an improved status for themselves and their group. For justice seekers the concept of relative deprivation is important: the perception that one’s own group is treated unfairly compared to another group.

Significance seeker

Significance seekers are people who are mainly motivated by a search for meaning and holding. In a quest for significance people try to make sense of their existence in line with the values of the community they feel they belong to. This may be achieved through identification with a (radical) ideology, a religion or a national pride. Such identification can even result in a state in which the person sacrifices himself for the sake of the group.

Thrill seeker

In this category we find people who search for sensation and adventure. Thrill seekers are often bored men who are filled with energy and who want to show their masculinity through starting the (radical) adventure. Romance
can also play a role. Some male jihadists mainly want to show their manhood to women while female thrill seekers may plunge into radical “adventure” because they are attracted to these men. Islamic women may be motivated by the possibility of a marriage with a fighter.

The table below displays the characteristics of the four types of radical persons and hypotheses as regards the trigger factors to which they are vulnerable.

This typology makes clear that radical persons can be very different from one another. There is no single radical identity. Although it is by no means the case that every radical person precisely fits one of the classes described, this typology provides useful insight in the triggers where persons with certain characteristics may be vulnerable to.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity seeker</td>
<td>Struggle with (hybrid) identity, quest for social binding.</td>
<td>Vulnerable to triggers related to identity and social binding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice seeker</td>
<td>Perceiving injustice, quest for justice.</td>
<td>Vulnerable to triggers related to perceived injustice towards oneself or one’s own group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance seeker</td>
<td>Crisis on personal level, quest for stability and meaning.</td>
<td>Vulnerable to triggers on the personal level and triggers related to an ideology that provides significance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrill seeker</td>
<td>Quest for sensation and adventure.</td>
<td>Vulnerable to triggers related to violence, adventure, romance and sensation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Further reading**

2.6 Organisational aspects of radical activities

Terrorist groups can take different organisational forms. First, they can exhibit characteristics of a formal organisation. This organisational form is characterized by goal orientation and rational management. They can also be a network of actors who are capable of self-organisation and are inter-connected by an ideology. A characteristic of networks is that they exhibit co-ordination in the absence of a centralized structure. Formal organisations and networks can be distinguished from social movements. Social movements consist of diverse individual actors and organisations loosely linked to one another (Comas et al., 2015).

Terrorist organisations can simultaneously take many of these organisational forms. Also, they can in the course of time shift to another organisational structure.

Terrorist groups adopt an organisational form if they strive for goal-oriented action. However, they are distinctive from traditional firms. In terror groups ends and means are constantly changing, while formal organisations are precisely characterized by a focussed goal-means orientation. In addition, the organisation of terrorist groups is often unclear. Accountability is obscured or intentionally spread among different persons for security reasons. If someone would bear all responsibility for the activities he would have to fear or his life.

A network form better fits most terrorist groups. Terrorist groups usually have access to critical resources such as people, resources and information. This capacity often lies with networks of individuals or loosely affiliated groups. These networks are characterized by voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal communication and exchanges. They are temporary and have no hierarchy. The raise of digital technologies has increased the reach, resilience and value of networks.

The idea of terrorism as a social movement emphasizes the broader context of forces that are essential for the development of terrorist organisations and networks. A social movement is a broad set of individual and organisational actors who are united by historical moments, critical cultural experiences and communication flows. In social movements a sense of solidarity or unity enables the expression and realization of profound changes in society. Social movements are primarily defined on the basis of the impact they achieve. They create a sense of purpose and an alternative reality for the participants.

2.6.1 Lone wolves

While some people radicalize as a member of a radical group, others radicalize on their own. Lone wolves may draw inspiration from a radical ideology, but, as their name implies, lack some form of group membership. Lone
actors find inspiration among various radical groups, such as right-wing reactionaries and religiously radicalised jihadists.

Although former lone wolf terrorists have not much in common there is one thing that they share: their self-radicalisation. Lone actors are distinguished from other radicals in that they have not committed themselves to continuous membership or group involvement. Their identification and internalization takes place through secondary sources, such as books, writings and manifestos. In today’s digital world the internet and other modern information outlets are also seen as important facilitators for self-radicalisation (Bates, 2012)

Lone actors have created and increasing dilemma in today’s security environment. Because they are not sponsored by a group or network of terrorists, they are extremely difficult to identify and counter. Lone actors do not have the resources and support available to other forms of terrorism, but they do not suffer from the liabilities experienced by many of these groups neither. Although they usually are not capable for large-scale operations the threat they pose should not be underestimated. Many of the terrorist attacks that have taken place in recent years were committed by lone actors (Bates, 2012).

Bates (2012) proposed a sociologically informed typology that categorizes lone wolf terrorism in terms of motivation, extent of radicalisation, form, and risk-awareness. This typology is depicted in the figure below.

The horizontal axis depicts the extent of involvement in the radicalisation process. Although self-radicalisation is a basic characteristic of the lone wolf terrorist, the extent to which this process involves personal development or socialization through external contacts is a critical difference between types of lone wolves. In addition to their self-exposure to extremist ideology through literature or web-site, some lone wolves have had some organisational exposure and even training.

On the second dimension we find a continuum from egoistic to altruistic. On the egoistic side we find self-centred terrorists who manifest anti-social characteristics. They may consider themselves above the constraints of the community and a special ideological organisation. Egoistic terrorists have a strong belief in their self-superiority; they may feel either individually “called” or uniquely capable of committing and succeeding. Altruistic lone wolf terrorists are motivated more by a perceived obligation to a cause crusade. These people justify their actions as selfless acts indicative of their commitment to a greater cause.

The third dimension stands for the form of terrorism. It is a continuum between single event and serial terrorism. Lone wolves may initially intend to conduct a single event of terrorism, but move towards increased activity if
they are successful. Likewise, a career of minor acts of lone wolf action may encourage an individual to seek a more definitive form of terrorism, culminating in a dramatic, final act. This transformation process of serial terrorist to a dramatic single event terrorist has been evident in many right-wing and single issue terrorists, as in the cases of anti-abortion, animal rights or eco-lo-gical violence.

The final dimension is the degree of risk activity acceptable to the lone wolf terrorist. Lone wolf terrorists may be influenced by their willingness to either seek or avoid the consequences associated with different acts of individual terrorism. As a continuum, we have seen individuals who have increa-singly engaged in riskier acts. In some ways, suicide bombers are the ultimate risk-seeking terrorists, but even in these instances the selection of the targets and the degree to which they are protected reflect different risk-versus- reward calculations (Bates, 2012).

The typology provides a relevant understanding of different forms of lone actor terrorism. It makes clear that lone actors do not differ only as regards the ideologies they adhere to, but also as regards their position on the four dimensions of the model.

2.6.2 The facilitating role of the Internet

Radical groups can use social media to spread their influence. They use Facebook and internet sites for raising donations. Chat rooms are also be useful social media tools because they function as an open forum where anyone can join the conservation. Radical groups like al-Qaida use chat rooms for recruitment and radicalisation into their ideology. Social media can be deployed to encourage users to generate and report information that normally would have been kept private. Moreover, social media are used for propaganda; it is a means to spread information that manipulates the user’s world view.

Especially in the Western world the Internet is used as a means to radicalize young people. Al-Qaida and its affiliates understand how much Western countries rely on information sharing and use of technology to communicate. With their online magazine, called Inspire, Al-Qaida transmits its terrorist ideology. It encourages young people from the West to self-radicalize and carry out attacks against the West. Some terrorist organisations even target children on the Internet with cartoons and entertaining media that serve as propaganda (Thomson, 2011).

Extreme right-wing groups are active on the internet as well. Like Muslim radicals, they use the internet to attract new members with appealing website and interactive elements, such as surveys, chats and fora. Through cyber communities that transcend national borders, right-wing extremists propagate their ideals of (paradoxically) more national sovereignty among like-minded people (Caiani et al., 2015).

In recent years, expertise on the digital media use by jihadists and other extremists has grown. Policies to combat radicalisation have more and more a focus on digital channels for communication, logistics and recruitment (NCTV, 2016). A recent study (Sikkens et al., 2016) study shows that Facebook can play a facilitating role in identifying and approaching young people who are difficult to find in the off-line world because they don’t trust anyone outside their network. Young people with leftist ideals and converted young Muslim often use a public profile on Facebook. Young people with far-right sympathies are more difficult to find. They seem to prefer using community forums rather than Facebook.
Further reading


This chapter deals with the three most prevalent forms of transformative radical thought in modern Europe: extreme right thought, extreme left thought and radical Islam. The three have also reacted on each other. The Jihad of Muslim radicals has provoked a right-wing extremist counter-jihad aimed at keeping Muslims out of Europe. Meanwhile, right-wing extremist who fiercely criticize Islam regard left-wingers the most important enemy for their open attitudes towards newcomers (Schaffer, 2016).

Complex social phenomena such as radicalisation are always subject to change. This is one of the reasons why there has been debate about the definition of (among other ideologies) the extreme-right for decades (Van der Valk & Wagenaar, 2010). In the next section we will nevertheless try to provide an overview of the three large political ideologies. We do not aim to present the full picture of radical thought in Europe but instead highlight some characteristic features of the three most important ideological currents from which radicals draw inspiration.

Radical persons do not always clearly fit one current (e.g. national separatists and hooligans). Also, there are divisions between radical groups and individuals who are associated with the same ideology. However, general descriptions of the broad ideologies can be provided and will contribute to an improved understanding of contemporary radical thought.

### 2.7.1 Extreme right thoughts

**Extreme-right ideology**

The extreme-right is hard to define but some conceptual agreement exists as regards the basic features of the extreme-right ideology. The most notable features are: nationalism, racism, strong criticism on the political system and parliamentary democracy, the leadership principle and the fight against political opponents. Some of these features express the anti-egalitarian value of the extreme-right which is reflected in racism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia and exclusion of groups. Supporters of the extreme right-wing ideology criticize the current functioning of the democratic system and advocate a strong leader and state (Fermin, 2009).

Mudde (2000), an influential researcher on the of radical right, describes four features of the radical right ideology, which partly correspond to the features mentioned above:

- Nationalism: the belief that the political unit (the state) and the cultural unit (the nation or ethnic community) should be congruent.
Xenophobia: everything what is considered ‘alien’, or deviating from their own nation and conventions, is portrayed as negative and is perceived as threatening.

Welfare chauvinism: the belief that the fruits of the national economy should first and foremost (if not exclusively) come to the benefit of the nation’s ‘own people’.

Law and order: the belief that the state should maintain a strict legal system and should enforce these rules actively and rigorously.

In a revision of his work Mudde defines the new ‘populist radical right’ ideology as a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism, of which nativism is considered a key feature (Mudde, 2007). His definition of the populist radical right applies to political parties and not to radicalizing individuals. However, an understanding of the key feature of nativism can contribute to one’s understanding of the radical right ideology in general. The second feature, authoritarianism, is also worth mentioning in the context of radicalisation.

Nativism is defined by Mudde as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state”. So nativism closely resembles the combination of xenophobia and nationalism. The basis for defining (non) “nativeness” can be diverse. According to Mudde, this basis can be ethnic, racial or religious, but will always have a cultural component.

Authoritarianism, according to Mudde, is “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely”. This definition includes law and order and “punitive conventional moralism”. Authoritarians will be more inclined to accept (established) authority than non-authoritarians, although they can and will rebel under certain circumstances (Mudde, 2007).

**Extreme-right groups**

To improve one’s understanding of radical thought in Europe it is also worth looking at some distinct groups. In a publication about racism, antisemitism and extreme-right violence (Tierolf et al. 2015) a distinction is made between on the one hand identitarian formations and on the other hand neo-Nazist formations. In addition to these classical radical groups we want to mention the counter-jihadists. A brief overview of these formations will be given below.

Identitarian formations are in pursuit of an ideal of a homogeneous people in the area where people are historically established. In these groups the distinction between “own” and “alien” focuses on the language of the country and the cultural and ethnic identity of the ‘original’ people. This is reflected in the rejection of external influence or threats to the nation, which is primarily about “foreign” influence on immigration. Identitarian formations also defend themselves against ‘threats’ such as the influence of English loanwords or the presence of ‘culture-alien’ foreign multinationals (Tierolf et al., 2015).

Neo-Nazi formations differ from identitarian formations primarily by defining the ‘own’ and ‘foreign’ on the basis of biological-racial features. According to neo-Nazi’s the white race is biologically superior to other races, including Jews. In addition, they orient themselves, in contrast to identitary formations, especially on ‘Germanic brother nations’ and less on the national language. Finally, they often seek a restoration of a Greater German Reich, in the tradition of the Third Reich from the period 1933-1945. Music, performances and bands are often a binding element in the international neo-Nazi world, especially among extreme right-wing skinheads.

In the view of counter-jihadists, Europe and the United States are threatened by an aggressive and politicized Islamic world. They fear that Muslims in Europe will trigger a process of Islamization, with the introduction of
Sharia law as their ultimate goal. According to counter-jihadist, the Islamic threat implies a removal of Christian and Jewish symbols, imposition of Islamic traditions and the creation of no-go areas for Non-Muslims. Counter-jihadists regard themselves as defenders of the "Western civilization" while describing Muslims and Islam as the cultural other. They consider Muslims to be a homogenized and hostile mass and consider Islam as a totalitarian political force. Any action that can be associated with this view of Islam is regarded as evidence for the hostile intentions of Muslims (Lee, 2015).

The above mentioned groups can both be called white supremacists. A prominent theme in these groups is the supremacy of the white race and the inherent inferiority of all other races. This kind of thinking is often justified through religion. The (Christian) religious identity is transformed in ways that strengthen the identification with the white race. Another prominent theme is the abolition of rights for whites. Many white supremacist organisations claim that whites are deprived of investigating and celebrating their identity. White supremacist organisations put their objections in a frame of white oppression even though relatively few whites are actually facing discrimination (Adams & Roscigno, 2005).

**Further reading**


2.7.2  Extreme left thoughts

Extreme-left ideology

Supporters of radical leftist ideologies are positioned left to social democracy. Their view of society entails a commitment to equity and income redistribution. Supporters of the radical left claim to make a stand for excluded groups, such as migrants and the unemployed. In addition, they reject the under-lying capitalist values, which are considered to be the main cause of social inequality. The rise of a consumer society is also condemned by left-wing extremists, and sometimes they even call for abolishment of private property (Visser et al., 2014).

Radical leftists strongly oppose the established political and economic elites. They are highly critical of multinational military and economic arrangement, such as NATO and the IMF. Moreover, they oppose growing privatization of education, health and transportation, as well as international free trade agreements, such as the Transatlantic Investment Partnership (TTIP). Radical left parties are pro-(participatory) democracy. Also, most of them are internationalist because collaboration across borders is deemed a necessary basis for resisting the onslaught of global capitalism. Environmentalism, feminism and workers’ self-management have also been embraced by the extreme-left (Amini, 2015; Visser et al., 2014).

Extreme-left groups

Various groups are situated on the left side of the political spectrum. Some of them are activist and do not take illegal actions. Other (previously activist) groups are extremist or are situated in between activist and extremist as visualized on a spectrum. In the following section some large movements on the radical left will be briefly described.

The Radical Environmentalist and Animal Rights (REAR) movement consists of a loosely organized mix of individuals, groups and organisations that support radical measures in order to realize a world where animals and the environment are fully respected. Most of these actions are aimed at exposing environmental degradation and animal abuse. Many environmental and animal rights activists are followers of “deep ecology”, a movement focusing on the independent intrinsic value of nature and the equality of human and non-human species. However, the ideology of the RAER movement involves various ideas and philosophies that are sometimes conflicting each other.

Most RAER activists believe that their goals can be achieved through a radical reform of the political system. A minority of extreme activists endorse anti-capitalist and anarchist ideas and believes that only a revolution can save the planet. The REAR-movement can best be described as an idea. It acts as a source of inspiration for groups and activists around the world who act anonymously. The net-work has no hierarchical structure; it is held together by a common aim: destroying the property of those who pose a threat to the natural environment and its inhabitants (Hirsch-Hoefler & Mudde, 2014).

Left activist and extreme groups resisting asylum and aliens policies are united in the No Border Network. This is a network of loose associations of autonomous actors who support freedom of movement and resist human migration control. Their action includes coordinating international border camps, demonstrations, direct actions and anti-deportation campaigns. It is a movement for people who “want to help to create a world without borders, where no one is prevented from moving because of where you were born, or because of race, class or economic resources, or because of any other barrier im-posed on us by capitalist elites and their governments and police” (No Borders UK, 2016). The no Borders Network is an anti-capitalist movement. It states that borders are
created by and serve capitalist elites. Actions are aimed at for instance the border system and its infrastructure and deportation flights (No Borders UK, 2016).

Some left extremist are not organized around a single issue but form broad partnerships. A unifying factor is that they are anarchic in word and thought and extremist in their actual manifestations. These anarchist groups do not only oppose their classic enemy – capitalism – but increasingly oppose, among other things, fascism and asylum policies. They say to strive for a free society without class, states or borders, but with a healthy natural environment. Direct action in the form of graffiti and vandalism are important means for them. Since oppression, exploitation and capitalism are global phenomena, the anarchist struggle takes place on an international level (AIVD, 2013).

Noteworthy is the International of Anarchist Organisations (IFA). Their aim is “to counter the inter-nationalisation of state and capitalist powers that are developing their influences ever rapidly on a global scale” (IFA, 2016). The federations associated with IFA believe that international coordination and cooperation is necessary to reach their mutual aims.

Further reading


2.7.3 Radical Islamic thoughts

In recent decades, Islamic radicalism has become widespread in large parts of Europe. Various terms are associated with Islamic radicalism: extremism, fundamentalism, Islamism and jihadism. Below, these terms will be explained. We will use the definitions provided by Winter and Hasan (2016). Next, the phenomenon of jihadism will be placed in a broader (historical) context.

Extremism, fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism

Extremism is a dismissive and dogmatic orientation characterized by a lack of balance in all elements of the ideological outlook of an individual. Extremists are strongly convinced of their ideological per-spective. Islamic extremists assume that the religious law should apply for both the public and private sphere. They reject cultural norms and values which do not fit into the religious tradition. Extremists see those who are faithful to their interpretation of scripture as morally and ethically superior to others.
Fundamentalists try to legitimize his or her views by way of a non-contextual analysis of relevant religious texts. Fundamentalists rely on an ancient, historical context and propagate ideals of an earlier age. For fundamentalists, the script and dogmatic foundations are in the first place. These are used to legitimize moral and legal rules.

Islamists try to implement its fundamentalist viewpoint (which is necessarily extremist in nature) with the aim of bringing government structures in accordance with this view. Islamism is a form of instru-mentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups and organisations that pursue political goals. Islamism pro-vide political answers to contemporary social challenges by proposing a future based on Islamic tradi-tion. Islamists distill from Islam an administrative framework and seek a way to implement this frame-work.

Jihadists use violence to spread Islamic beliefs worldwide. The term jihad refers to the holy war of Muslims against infidels, the modern world or democratic principles. For jihadists, violence is no longer a means but an end in itself. Jihadism is a radical, militarized version of Islamism in which a strong sense of urgency exists. Jihadists consider it necessary to use force because, because force is the only way to destroy the status quo in the short term (Winter & Hasan, 2016).

Jihadism in practice

The terms 'jihadism' refers to the militant Sunni Muslim ideologies who demand an armed struggle in the name of God. The followers of Jihad aim to defend Muslim territories, to establish Islamic Emirates and to re-establish the Caliphate. Within the Jihadist movement various groups can be distinguished. Al Qaeda, one of the most prominent groups, seen the United States as the main enemy and believes that the US should be attacked everywhere by all available means, including suicide terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Local militant groups in Muslim countries, by contrast, focus on a fight against their respective regimes (Nesser, 2011).

Jihadism emerged as an internationally oriented movement in the 1980s. At that time the Salafist-Jihadist movement emerged in Afghanistan. This movement established branches in the Muslim world as well as in Western countries, especially in Europe. Saudi Salafism focuses heavily on the religious prin-ciples of absolute monotheism (tawhid), strict adherence to the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet (al-Sunnah), and following the first Muslims (al-Salaf al-Salih).

Within Salafism, the world is divided into the "land of Islam" (dar al-Islam) governed by Islamic law (al-shariah), and "the land of unbelief" (dar al-kufr). The land of unbelief can transform under certain conditions "land of war" in which every Muslim has a religious duty to fight.

Salafi-jihadism has a classic and a global political rationale. Classical jihad refers either to the armed struggle to overthrow secular Muslim regimes and to establish Islamic states or the armed struggle against non-Muslims who occupy Muslim territory. The global jihad concerns the armed struggle against all enemies of Islam, and especially the US. The objective is to withhold the West from interference in Muslim countries. It concerns interference in military and economic terms, but cultural influences as well.

In Europe we find some semi-organized groups that focus on propaganda and supporting activities. Here, we find no militant organisations equivalent to Al Qaeda in Iraq or Maghreb. The latter groups maintain websites and present ideological programs and strategies, which promote a violent jihad in Europe. From an ideological perspective, jihadists consider European countries as countries of unbelief. Europe's militant Sunni's regard themselves as a vanguard of true believers in an ocean of unbelievers (Nesser, 211).
Further reading


2.8 Radical movements in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, Islamic radicalism gets quite a lot of attention. Islamic radicalism manifests itself mainly in the form of Salafism. Commonly three main currents are distinguished within the Salafist movement in the Netherlands: the a-political current, the political current and the jihadist current. Although the first two of these currents are non-violent the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) states that all three currents constitute a risk for social cohesion because of their anti-integrative attitudes. Thus the risk of radicalisation exists not only in the jihadist but also in the non-political and political branches of Salafism (Fermin, 2009).

Since 2009 the Salafist ‘establishment’ is increasingly exploring the boundaries set by the Dutch government. In 2014 it was found that its leaders are ambivalent towards the armed struggle in Syria. Such attitudes can undermine anti-radicalisation policies. Besides, clear examples of intolerance, into-lerant isolationism and undemocratic activities are frequently observed. An increasing range of educational activities is being offered by Salafist welfare organizations. This reflects that some Salafist organizations possess the financial and organizational means to expand their influence. Moreover, there are concerns as regards the increased influence of young Salafist factions within Mosque management boards (AIVD, 2015b).

Whereas Islamic radical activity has increased in recent years the number of right-wing extremists has dropped sharply. It is estimated that today there are only a few dozens of them. The development of the threat of the extreme right to the Dutch democratic legal order is characterized by little support, personal animosity and disagreement, ideological disagreements and organizational fragmentation. These characteristics mitigate the threat the extreme right poses. There is no development towards terrorism from a right-wing extremist inspiration or motivation – although that does not mean that loners cannot use violence from right-wing extremist inspiration or motivation (AIVD, 2016b; AIVD, 2016c).

In the Netherlands left-wing extremism does not constitute a major threat since the 1980’s. However, there are (peaceful) protests by Dutch left wing activists against transportations of nuclear waste and the construction of power plants. In recent years left wing extremism has been directed against asylum and aliens policies. According to the AIVD, airlines can be involved in this since extremists consider charter flights with rejected asylum seekers a breech block of government policies. Dutch anti-globalists are not very active nowadays. Only G8-summits are surrounded with diverse protests, but usually there is only Dutch involvement in these protests if the summit takes place in a neighbour country (AIVD, 2016d).

Increasing polarisation can also constitute a breeding ground for radicalisation. In the recent period there has been a heated debate about the racist content of the Netherlands. This debate coincided with insults and threats. In response to the arrival of refugees and a corresponding fear of terrorism increasingly open activities of the
extreme right have taken place. Also, partly in response, the some-times violent opposition by the extreme left against asylum policies and against the extreme right has increased since mid-2015 (Rijksoverheid, 2016).

There is no largescale pro-life radicalism in the Netherlands. Regularly, pro-life actions take place that are perceived as a nuisance, but in general the limits of the law are not exceeded in these actions. All abortion clinics is the Netherlands are every now and then confronted with protests by the members of the fundamentalist Christian group Cry for Life (CASA klinieken, 2016).

**Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation in the Netherlands**

In the Netherlands a broad range of measures is carried out in order to combat radicalisation. On the national level the National Contraterorrism Strategy is implemented to stimulate the cohesion of these measures so that terrorism and extremism can be combatted more effictively (NCTV, 2016). This Strategy is based on a broad approach. With a combination of preventive an repressive measures the risks of terrorism are recognized and tackled as quickly as possible. The Strategy stands for a struc-tural basic level of policy, operational and management efforts, which is supplemented with flexible efforts if the threat demands it.

The National Contraterorrism Strategy focusses on all forms of radicalism. Since Jihadism is relatively strongly represented in the Netherlands Jihadism gets specific attention in Dutch public policy. Most notable is the Integral Approach to Jihadism (NCTV, 2014). This approach has three goals: (1) pro-ecting the democracy and the rechtsstaat, combatting and weakening the Jihadist movement in the Netherlands and (3) reducing the breeding grounds for radicalisation.

The measures in this action can be divided into five groups of measures. To get a concrete picture of the Dutch anti-Jihadism Policy an overview of the types of measures that are included in the Integrated Approach Jihadism will be provided below:

- **Risk reduction Jihad travellers**
  The risks posed by jihad travellers will be limited by any means necessary. These include cri-minal, administrative and social measures to tackle jihad travellers so that they can do no further damage.

- **Interventions exit journey**
  The Dutch government wants to prevent that people travel to conflict areas to join a violent jihadist group. If a travel can be reasonably suspected judicial action is being taken.

- **Radicalisation**
  Radicalisation and societal unrest are detected countered. Recruiters are tackled and people who spread ideology are disturbed. New Jihadi movement followers are stopped.

- **Social media**
  The government wants to counter the spread of online radicalisation, hate speech and violent jihadist information. Producers and distributors of online jihadist propaganda and the digital platforms they are abuse are identified. This information is actively shared with the operational authorities and relevant service providers.

- **Information exchange and cooperation**

The national governments and involved municipalities make agreements on the prevention of radica-lisation and management of social tensions. In this way the integrated approach and cooperation between municipalities, local partners, schools and the police is established.
Radicalisation is also countered by the Dutch government in a more indirect way. Indirectly, social tensions can contribute to an increase of extremism and terrorism. This requires special attention for policies that counter polarization and stimulate social cohesion. The Ministeries of Social Affairs and the Interior coordinate efforts in this area. They collaborate with the Ministory of Safety and Justice and the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, the local government and social partners.

Radicalisation by the Dutch government also contested more indirectly. Indirectly contributing social tensions to the growth of extremism and terrorism. This requires special attention to policies that counteract polarization and promotes social cohesion. The Ministries of Social Affairs and the Interior coordinate efforts in this area. They collaborate with the Ministries of V & J and Health, local government and social partners.

Noteworthy in this context is the National Action Programme against Discrimination. This Action Programme includes measures aimed at prevention and awareness, strengthening of cooperation between the chain partners, promotion of local, broad discrimination policies and the establishment of a joint knowledge program. The programme focusses on:

- Stronger commitment to diversity and inclusive organizations within the (semi) public authorities and industry
- The role of education in preventing discrimination and promoting awareness
- Preventing discrimination in social media
- Strengthen role and approach to anti-discrimination provisions
- Cooperation with others in combating organizations that are involved in discrimination
- Strengthening of criminal prosecution
- Improvement of recording and reporting
- Tackling discrimination by the Inspectorate Social Affairs and Employment

Finally, the Dutch government is strengthening citizenship education. Initially citizenship education was introduced in the Netherlands with a low profile police. It seeks to find the right balance between guiding schools on the one hand and leaving enough space for a school specific interpretation on the other hand (SLO, 2009). Citizenship education policies are developing quickly in the Netherlands. In recent years primary and secondary schools have taken important steps. In 2015, citizenship education has also been sharpened in the Dutch secondary vocational education (MBO). Students on this school level now receive more education in critical thinking and dialogue on complex issues, such as radicalisation, discrimination and freedom of expression (Rijksoverheid, 2015).

In sum a wide range of anti-radicalisation policy is in force in the Netherlands. There is a constant alertness to extremist and terrorist acts. Most attention is paid to Muslim radicalisation, but also for other forms of radicalisation is keen eye. The Dutch government is strongly committed to both prevention and repression of radicalism, aiming for an integrated approach. It constantly stresses the importance of cooperation between different parties, which is important in order to effectively combat radicalisation.
3. What works?
3 What works?

3.1 Introduction

Good practices have been developed for first-line practitioners. These good practices and methods help professionals to recognize some of the signs presented by vulnerable young people at risk and to empower them with tools and instruments to respond appropriately. The work done within the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) serves as a starting point and point of reference. See


The Collection of RAN is practical, evolving and growing. It is widely recognized as authoritative. As RAN, we hope practitioners can

- draw inspiration from it;
- find replicable examples to adapt to their local/specific context;
- look for counterparts to exchange prevention experiences.

In this chapter, we will show the aims and methods of different practices. We follow the text from the RAN website. We start with early detection practices, followed by prevention activities. Then three different kinds of interventions are presented. These chapters are focused on community empowerment and engagement, family support and delivering alternative narratives. In the last chapter exit strategies are discussed. In the last paragraph we make the connection with the YCARE Toolbox, containing good practices and activities.
3.2 Early detection strategies

This approach consist in raising awareness of first line practitioners working with vulnerable individuals or groups at risk of radicalisation in order to ensure that they are well equipped to detect and to respond to radicalisation. Throughout Europe training courses have been developed to raise awareness and understanding among firstliners who have responsibility for individuals who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. First line workers have been identified as a key group that can make an important contribution to this issue and include teachers, youth workers, community police officers, child protection workers, (mental) health care workers. In contrast to policy makers for example, first line workers - potentially - have the ability to recognise and refer individuals who may be vulnerable. However, they do not always have a sufficient understanding of radicalisation, do not understand the warning signs, or know what to do in response. Therefore, raising their awareness on this issue is required.
### 3.3 Prevention strategies

Apart from the above-mentioned approaches it is preferable to invest in prevention. In preventing and countering polarisation and radicalisation ideally three levels are involved: primary, secondary and tertiary prevention.

Primary prevention is aimed at preventing a breeding ground for polarisation and radicalisation. Secondary prevention aims to reduce or eliminate an existing breeding ground and to directly combat incipient radical or polarising ideas among young people. To conclude, tertiary prevention is aimed at action against radicalised young people who (threaten to) put their ideas into practice (see e.g. Gielen, 2008).
3.4 Intervention strategies

In its inventory polarization and radicalisation: a test of the foundations of social interventions, Movisie (2011) examined the assumptions of anti-radicalisation projects and tested these by international scientific literature. It turned out that anti-radicalisation projects can be divided into four types:

- **System approach.** Improvement of the personal living circumstances of radicalising young people through a coherent supply of assistance, in which multiple domains are involved (e.g., parents, school, work, care).
- **Peer methods.** Risk youth are addressed / supported by peers rather than professionals.
- **Bridging contact.** Bringing together young people with different backgrounds in order to create more tolerance.
- **Strengthening resilience.** Empowerment of young people against radical thoughts or persons by enhancing their self-esteem.

### 3.4.1 System approach

This approach states that, improving personal lives of radical youngsters through coherent and special help, will lead them in the long run to abandon their radical ideas. As a result, threatening behaviour and other problems related to radical extremism will cease.

The system method is effective against antisocial and criminal behaviour among youngsters, more effective than other forms of social support. It is its integral approach, the main success factor. The system method is promising for radical youngsters: the chances of a “normal” life are bigger. This method is most appropriate for those who tend to follow others easily. However, the effect of the system method on lessening radical ideology is not clear. Advocates for this method, should consider to:

- Identify the relationship between radical behaviour and social environment
- Emphasize positive development of youngsters
- Stimulate responsible behaviour of family members (specially parents) and discourage irresponsible behaviour.
- Make the intervention more action-oriented
- Devote attention to problems of other secondary family members too

### 3.4.2 Peer methods

This approach states that, when risk-youngsters are approached or mentored by someone from their “own group” or same age (peer), the effect on changing their behaviour will be far more favourable, than when approached by someone who do not belong to their group, such as teachers or other adults. Therefore, this method favours involving peers in social interventions as an effective mean to make youngsters less vulnerable for radical ideas and extreme behaviour.

Peer mediation provides positive contributions to polarized relationships and conflicts among young-sters. Mainly, youngsters who are educated to be mediators benefit from this method. The effect of peer mediation on youngsters who are “mediated” is less clear. The casual connection between the involvement of peers and positive results of peer mediation cannot be determined.
Advocates of this method should consider that:

- Peer mediation is most functional in early stages of conflict
- Peer mediation could be worthwhile and provide with positive results, however it is not advisable to always substitute professional adults for young peers.
- It is important to consider: is it ethical to involve young peers in every conflictive situation?

### 3.4.3 Intergroup contact

This approach states that, organizing and facilitating events in which youngsters from different ethnic and religious backgrounds come together, will lead to more tolerance among these youngsters.

Intergroup contact has gross modo a favourable outcome for mutual understanding (lessening stereotypes and prejudices). Intergroup contact does not do miracles: its positive effect is relatively small. There is no evidence of long term positive effect. The chances of success could be negatively affected under some circumstances (insufficient professional mentoring). Also, intergroup contact can even exacerbate the very same problem it tries to solve (further alienation among youngsters and confirmation of stereotypes). Overall conclusions about the positive effect of intergroup contact do not necessarily pertain to youngsters.

Advocates for this method should:

- Stimulate empathy based on concrete examples, scenarios and role play.
- Ensure repetitive and structural contact
- Be reserved in talking about multicultural topics in class
- Limit the feeling of uncertainty about others: find a neutral environment

### 3.4.4 Strengthening resilience

This approach states that, strengthening the feeling of self-worth will make youngsters more resilient against influence by radical persons.

Empirical research has not shed much light on the positive effects of self-esteem on people’s behaviour and social interactions. The assumption that a high self-esteem contributes to the prevention of problematic behaviour among youngsters, has limited empirical support. The relationship between strengthening resilience and vulnerability to radicalism is difficult to assess.

Advocates of this method should consider that:

- Interventions should focus on buffering self-esteem, instead of enhancing self-esteem in a direct sense.
- Let radical youngsters reflect on their own values in relation to modern values
- Stimulate moral judgments based on real-life examples

### 3.4.5 Exit strategies

This approach consists in setting up programmes of de-radicalisation or disengagement aimed at reintegrating violent extremists (de-radicalisation) or at least dissuading them from violence (disengagement). Even after the best of prevention efforts, some individuals still become (violent) extremist. While reaching that stage, they may
fall under the responsibility of security services/police, and, in some cases, of justice and prison services. However, there will (most likely) come a day when the individual has finished his/her sentence and will have to be re-integrated into society. For a successful re-integration into society it is important to offer those inmates who committed offenses of violent extremism programmes of de-radicalisation or disengagement. “Exit” programmes should not only be offered to individuals who have faced imprisonment. Ideally, imprisonment should be prevented by offering this kind of programmes before the individual undertakes illegal activities. These programmes might therefore be targeted towards individuals in different stages of the radicalisation process; from those that have aligned with extremist groups but have not yet undertaken terrorist activities to those that have themselves executed terrorist attacks.
3.5 The YCARE Online Toolbox

The practices described by the RAN are directed to different stages in the development of youth getting radicalized. In the figure below the four stages are presented. In the YCARE Toolbox, the activities and good practices are labelled in this four stages.

The YCARE Toolbox consists of three separated boxes. In the first box we will store activities. This box contains training material in the form of exercises for immediate use in an educational context. The activities can be used for prevention ends but may also be useful in a setting in which counsellors work with radicalised youth.

The second box stores good practices. In countries such as the Netherlands and Germany many successful initiatives have been realised that contribute to combatting radicalisation. The good practices show what kind of efforts are undertaken in radicalisation prevention and intervention. They serve as a source of inspiration for further development of counter-radicalisation programs in countries all over Europe.

The third box stores awareness raising material such as: general tools, multimedia tools, promotional materials. This material will help professionals to gain more insight in the phenomenon of radicalisation. In addition to these YCARE Guidelines, the material in the third box will help professionals in detecting radicalisation.
The YCARE Online Toolbox

YCARE materials, activities, good practices and awareness raising tools, can be accessed via the online Toolbox platform. More specifically youth counsellors and trainers who are interested in training materials or didactic tools against radicalisation can search with criteria on our online platform, referred as YCARE online Toolbox, and find for free all available activities and good practices.

The YCARE online Toolbox Platform is an online database that contains a modular range of awareness raising, training activities and best practices for youth counsellors, trainers as well as other professionals working in the field of youth counselling, and are interested in making use new didactic tools combating problems such as radicalisation. You may find the YCARE online Toolbox in: https://toolbox.ycare.eu

How to search for YCARE activities, good practices and tools

Users can easily search for materials, like activities, good practices and awareness raising tools, on the YCARE online Toolbox platform. A criteria based search is supported, so youth counsellors or trainers can add one or multiple (more than one) searching criteria in order to narrow the result set and make it focused on their needs.

For searching the YCARE activities set, first click on the “Activities” box and then make use of the Search Form that appears (see the image below) to find the activities that fit to your searching criteria such as module (topic), group size, group age, duration and language. Then, click on the search button and the results (list of activities) will appear.
The results of your search appear in a list of boxes. Each box contains an activity, the title and all basic information you need in order to choose the activities you are interested in.

Click on an activity title to view the specific activity in details. In order to access the activity, you need to login yourself first in the platform. If you don't have an YCARE account, please register first (find the Register/Login forms on the top right area) or use your Facebook account.
After login, you can view / access the activities online (see the image below). You may also download the activity as a pdf file for offline use by clicking on the download button.

To find YCARE Good Practices or Awareness Raising Tools just click on the relevant box and a list with all available Good Practices or Awareness Raising Tools will appear. To access these materials click on the title and follow the link. No search functionality is supported.

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Share the content you find interesting with your colleagues and friends in the most popular Social Media Networks or by email.
Mobile Application

Finally, the YCARE Mobile Application is supporting an alternative means of accessing online all project’s materials like activities, good practices and awareness raising tools, for youth counsellors, trainers and other professionals working in the field of youth counselling, aiming at supporting them in preventing and combatting radicalisation. The YCARE Mobile Application is available for free at the Google Play Store (https://play.google.com/store)
References


Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (2015). Resolution 384. Link: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=23765511&Site=COE&direct=true


